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COMMENT
SENATE BILL 43: A REFINEMENT OF NORTH
CAROLINA'S INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT
PROCEDURES
INTRODUCTION
At Dorothea Dix, a North Carolina state mental health facil-
ity, there are two classes of patients. The distinction between these
classes is not made according to the patient's illnesses nor accord-
ing to the level of supervision each needs. Recently enacted Senate
Bill 43 makes the distinction a legal one that is determined by the
circumstances of the patient's original commitment. Those acquit-
ted of a crime by reason of insanity constitute one class,1 and those
committed into the facility by a third party (usually a family mem-
ber) constitute the other.2 While our legal system affirms that in-
sanity acquittees are not responsible for their crimes,3 our civil sys-
tem holds them to stricter standards for both commitment and
release.
In Part I, this Comment will examine the historical context of
Senate Bill 43. Part II will review the evolution of due process
rights of mentally ill people who undergo involuntary civil commit-
ment proceedings. Part III will demonstrate that the new require-
ments of Senate Bill 43 for automatic commitment and burden of
proof do not violate insanity acquittees' due process rights. Part IV
will show that the new "dangerousness test" of Senate Bill 43 en-
1. Defendants acquitted by reason of insanity will be referred to in this Com-
ment as "insanity acquittees."
2. Individuals committed to a mental hospital by a third party will be re-
ferred to in this Comment as "civil committees."
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-959 (1988).
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122C-251 to 122C-280 (1989 and Supp. 1991). This
Comment addresses involuntary civil commitments only. Voluntary commitment
procedures are governed by N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122C-211 to 122C-250 (1989 and
Supp. 1991).
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dangers due process rights of insanity acquittees. Part V will dis-
cuss the constitutionality of retrospective application of these dif-
ferent procedures to patients whose commitments predate the
defining legislation.
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF SENATE BILL 43
Senate Bill 43, passed by the North Carolina General Assem-
bly in 1991, is the defining legislation that draws the distinction
between insanity acquittees and civil committees.5 Prior to this
Bill, North Carolina law did not draw this distinction, and insanity
acquittees enjoyed the same due process protections as civil com-
mittees.' However, due to several recent cases, lawmakers began to
question the wisdom of treating both types of patients the same.7
John Hinckley's attempted assassination of President Reagan
and his successful insanity defense in a district with a broad stan-
dard for insanity8 created a national clamor for more rigorous in-
sanity standards.9 As a result, Congress passed insanity legislation
5. Senate Bill 43 amended N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1321 (1988). The Act
amended Chapter 122C sections 261, 263, 264, 266, 268, 269, 271, 273, 275, 276
and 277. The Act added to Chapter 122C sections 268.1 and 276.1.
6. Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, and Substance Abuse Act of
1985, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122C-1 to 122C-433 (1989 and Supp. 1991). Discussed
extensively in Part I, infra notes 47-63 and accompanying text.
7. Telephone interview with Senator Alexander P. Sands III, Dem., 24th
Dist. (July 15, 1991). The General Assembly did not change the standard for legal
insanity (M'Naghten Rule) because it was considered to be the toughest standard
available. A guilty but mentally ill verdict was contemplated. This alternative ver-
dict was-rejected when it was learned that states who had adopted this verdict
witnessed no significant decrease in the number of acquittals based on insanity
verdicts. However, the General Assembly found that involuntary commitment
procedures for insanity acquittees could be made more stringent.
8. At the time of John Hinckley's trial, the insanity defense in the District of
Columbia was based on language suggested in the Model Penal Code: "A person is
not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of
mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of law." Modern Penal Code § 4.01(1) (1962). In addition, the jury
had to acquit Hinckley by reason of insanity unless the government proved his
sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 114 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
9. The Hinckley trial precipitated legislative reform throughout the country.
Three years after the Hinckley verdict nine states had narrowed the insanity
standard, seven states shifted the burden of proving insanity to the defendant,
eight states substituted the not guilty by reason of insanity verdict with the guilty
but mentally ill verdict, and one state abolished the insanity defense altogether.
[Vol. 14:105
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which incorporates the M'Naghten standard.10 The M'Naghten
standard defines insanity as the inability of the defendant to ap-
preciate the difference between right and wrong.1 The M'Naghten
standard makes it difficult for a defendant to win an insanity de-
fense in federal court.12
Another case that influenced public opinion was the Michael
Hayes case.' 3 On July 14, 1989, Michael Hayes, charged with kill-
ing five people outside his moped repair shop in Winston Salem,
North Carolina,' was acquitted by reason of insanity.'5 "Hayes
found insane, not guilty in slayings" was the headline the next day
in The Raleigh News And Observer. 6 The acquittal reinforced the
public's fear that criminal defendants use the insanity plea to cir-
cumvent lengthy prison sentences.' 7 Strong public pressure pro-
vided the impetus for the North Carolina General Assembly to
pass Senate Bill 43.18
P.W. Low, J.C. Jeffries, Jr., R.J. Bonnie, TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR.: A CASE
STUDY IN THE INSANITY DEFENSE, 126-37 (1986) [hereinafter TRIAL OF JOHN W.
HINCKLEY].
10. At the national level, John Hinckley's successful insanity defense resulted
in Congress adopting this standard:
Affirmative defense. -It'is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under
any Federal statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts con-
stituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease
or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrong-
fulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute
a defense.
18 U.S.C. § 17 (1986).
11. Id.
12. The insanity test followed by the District of Columbia at the time John
Hinckley was tried incorporated, inter alia, the "irresistible impulse test." TRIAL
OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, supra note 9, at 14-21. This test adds flexibility to the
defense because a defendant may know the difference between right and wrong
yet still be unable to control his conduct. Id.
13. State v. Hayes, No. 88-CRS022702 (N.C. Sup. 1989).
14. The Raleigh News and Observer, July 19, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
15. The Raleigh News and Observer, April 15, 1989, at 1, col. 2.
16. Id.
17. Winston-Salem Journal, May 8, 1989, at 14, Col 5.
18. Telephone interview with Senator Alexander P. Sands III, Dem., 24th
Dist. (July 15, 1991). Since John Hinckley's successful insanity defense the legis-
lature had been thinking of making changes to relevant North Carolina insanity
statutes. However, Hayes' acquittal and public reaction provided the impetus for
immediate reform.
1991]
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Unlike the legislation that incorporated the M'Naghten stan-
dard, Senate Bill 43 does not change the legal definition of in-
sanity.19 Instead, Senate Bill 43 amends involuntary civil commit-
ment and release procedures for defendants found not guilty by
reason of insanity.20 The Bill makes three important changes in
these procedures: (1) a defendant found not guilty by reason of
insanity is automatically committed to a 24-hour mental hospital,21
thus eliminating the insanity acquittee's previous statutory right to
a pre-commitment hearing;22 (2) the burden of proof is shifted
from the state to the insanity acquittee at all subsequent hearings
for release;2 3 and (3) continued involuntary commitment can be
19. North Carolina goes by the M'Naghten test:
Insanity as a defense to a criminal charge is whether the defendant was
laboring under such a defect of reason from disease or deficiency of mind
at the time of the alleged act as to be (1) incapable of knowing the na-
ture and quality of his act, or (2) incapable of distinguishing between
right and wrong with respect to such act.
State v. Mancuso, 321 N.C. 464, 469, 364 S.E.2d 359, 363 (1988).
20. See supra note 5.
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1321 (Supp. 1991) reads:
Automatic civil commitment of defendants found not guilty by reason of
insanity.
When a defendant charged with a crime is found not guilty by reason of
insanity by verdict or upon motion pursuant to G.S. 15A-959(c) [pretrial
determination of insanity], the presiding judge shall enter an order find-
ing that the defendant has been found not guilty by reason of insanity of
a crime and committing the defendant to a State 24-hour facility desig-
nated pursuant to G.S. 122C-252 [twenty-four hour facilities for custody
and treatment of involuntary clients]. The court order shall also grant
custody of the defendant to a law enforcement officer who shall take the
defendant directly to that facility.
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1321 (Supp. 1991).
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-268.1 (Supp. 1991) reads in part:
Inpatient commitment: hearing following automatic commitment.
(a) A respondent who is committed pursuant to G.S. 15A-1321 [auto-
matic civil commitment] shall be provided a hearing unless waived,
before the expiration of 50 days from the date of his commitment.
(h) The respondent shall bear the burden to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that he is no longer dangerous to others. If the court is so
satisfied, then the respondent shall bear the burden to prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence (i) that he does not have a mental illness, or
(ii) that confinement is not necessary to ensure his own survival or safety
and that confinement is not necessary to alleviate or cure his illness. If
the court is so satisfied, then the court shall order the respondent dis-
charged and released. If the court finds that the respondent has not met
[Vol. 14:105
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based solely on a finding of dangerousness,24 thus eliminating
mental illness as a required condition for continued confinement.
The new procedures could result in commitment of some in-
sanity acquittees who might have been released under prior civil
commitment statutes.25 The new procedures are therefore adverse
to insanity acquittees' liberty interests. The question this Com-
ment asks is whether these procedures violate due process rights.
Before examining this issue, a historical overview of due process
will help put this question into context.
II. EVOLUTION OF DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
A. The Addition of Due Process Protections for Mentally Ill
People
As late as 1960, involuntary confinement in a hospital was not
considered, "such [a] loss of liberty .. .as is within the meaning
of the constitutional provision that 'no person shall be deprived of
his burdens of proof, then the court shall order that inpatient commit-
ment continue at a 24-hour facility ... for a period not to exceed 90
days.
24. Id.
25. The first procedural change, automatic commitment, precludes immedi-
ate release of a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity. Immediate re-
lease of a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity was possible under
prior law. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1321 (Supp. 1991).
A shift of burden of proof to the insanity acquittee will make it difficult for
some insanity acquittees to win release. "A standard of proof represents an at-
tempt to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society
thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular
type of adjudication." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970). The higher the
degree of confidence required, the higher the proof required, and the higher soci-
ety's disapproval of a wrong result. Id. at 370, 372. See also Lego v. Twomey, 404
U.S. 477, 493-94 (1972), and Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958). It
follows that a higher standard of proof allows fewer wrong results than a lower
standard. The burden of proof has .been referred to as the "risk of nonpersua-
sion." 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2485 (Chadbourn ed. 1981). What this means is
that in cases where the matter is very close, the person who has to bear the bur-
den of proof will lose. TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, supra note 9, at 3.
There are no studies which demonstrate the effect of the "dangerousness
test" (recommitment based on dangerousness alone) on the liberty interest of in-
sanity acquittees. However, it is logical to assume that the intent of this statutory
test is to force a dangerous insanity acquittee to remain committed even if there
are no signs of mental illness. These patients would have been released under
previous law. See infra notes 47-63 and accompanying text.
1991]
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life, liberty or property without due process of law.' "2 Criteria for
commitment was expressed in vague and overly broad language."
For example, in 1967, 24 states provided for involuntary commit-
ment if a citizen was "in need of treatment."28 North Carolina stat-
utes prior to 1973, provided that "commitment could be initiated
by certification of two physicians . . . [N]o counsel was provided
and no court hearing or review was mandated." 9
The drive to protect individual rights in the 1960's inspired
the legal community to take an interest in the rights of the men-
tally ill.30 The legal community weighed the potential benefits to
society of involuntary commitment against the mentally ill per-
son's interest in retaining his personal liberty, and concluded that
a mentally ill person has a need for due process protection. 31
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court responded and held
that involuntary civil commitment involves liberty interest that re-
26. Prochaska v. Brinegar, 251 Iowa 834, 838, 102 N.W.2d 870, 872 (1960)
(citations omitted). Although the Iowa Supreme Court did iot recognize involun-
tary commitment as a fourteenth amendment due process violation, it was long
established that individuals subjected to the possibility of involuntary commit-
ment do have due process rights. In 1901, the United States Supreme Court ruled
that commitment must be proceeded by notice and an opportunity to contest.
Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427 (1901).
27. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58 (repealled after 1971) (vague standards of
commitment based on mental illness, mental retardation, or inebriety, plus grave
disability or need for treatment) The United States Supreme Court in O'Connor
v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), ruled that vague commitment standards based
solely on the need for treatment were unconstitutional. See infra, notes 36-41 and
accompanying text.
28. Projects, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 14 UCLA L. REV. 822,
828 (1967).
29. Miller & Fiddleman, Involuntary Civil Commitment in North Carolina:
The Result of the 1979 Statutory Changes, 60 N.C.L. REV. 985, 993 (1982) (exam-
ines the role of psychiatrists and attorneys in the commitment process and con-
cludes that the 1979 statutory changes, designed to increase due process protec-
tions, are not in the best interests of candidates for commitments and civil
committees).
30. See Andalman & Chambers, Effective Counsel for Persons Facing Civil
Commitment: A Survey, a Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 43 (1974); Cur-
ran, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 31 N.C.L. REV. 274 (1953).
31. Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57
MICH. L. REV. 945 (1959). Studied the effect that hospitalization had on the legal
capacity of a patient in a mental health facility. From state to state, due process
procedures were loosely worded. There was little agreement as to what civil rights
the mental patients retained.
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quires the presence of due process procedures.3 2 The Court in
other cases developed specific procedural safeguards related to in-
voluntary civil commitment. These safeguards include reasonable
notice,3 a judicial hearing,3" and access to an advocate counsel. 5
In 1975, the United States Supreme Court set even higher
standards for the states.36 In O'Connor v. Donaldson, the Court
ruled that involuntary civil commitment based solely on mental ill-
ness is unconstitutional.3 7 "The mere presence of mental illness
does not disqualify a person from preferring his home to the com-
forts of an institution. '38 Public intolerance and unease is not a
compelling justification for involuntary confinement. 9 However,
the state is constitutionally justified in commitment of a mentally
ill person who presents a danger to the public or himself."0 Mental
illness and dangerousness are the criteria that must be established
for commitment. "1
32. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). See also Humphrey v. Cady,
405 U.S. 504 (1972); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S.
605 (1967).
33. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (due process requires notice, availabil-
ity of legal counsel and an adversarial hearing). See also French v. Blackburn, 428
F. Supp. 1351 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (notice of a hearing must adequately inform a
person to whom it is directed).
34. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (a prisoner could not be transferred to
a mental health facility without a hearing and court appointed counsel); Jackson
v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (a defendant unlikely ever to be declared compe-
tent to stand trial must be provided a full hearing within a "reasonable time");
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972) (an individual convicted under Wiscon-
sin's Sex Crime Act could not be confined beyond the period of the original sen-
tence without a new hearing).
35. Vitek 445 U.S. at 491. See also Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078
(E.D. Wis. 1972); In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Heryford v.
Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968) (court held that "an individual sought to be
detained on grounds of mental illness has the right to counsel, including ap-
pointed counsel if the individual states that he is unable to afford counsel." See
generally, Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the
Mentally Ill, 44 TEx. L. REV. 424 (1966). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-62 (1989), pro-
vides that a patient may consult with legal counsel at any reasonable time. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 122C-270 (Supp. 1991) provides for special counsel for indigent
respondents.
36. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
37. Id. at 576.
38. Id. at 575.
39. Id. at 576.
40. Id. at 575.
41. State v. Fields, 324 N.C. 204, 376 S.E.2d 740 (1989) (a person found not
1991]
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The United States Supreme Court in Addington v. Texas4 2
further addressed due process by examining the burden of proof
used in civil commitment hearings.43 The Court ruled the prepon-
derance of the evidence standard too low because it ran the "risk
of increasing the number of individuals erroneously committed."
4 4
The Court set as a minimum standard for the state the burden of
clear and convincing evidence because it impresses upon the
factfinders the high value that society "places on individual lib-
erty." 5 To complete its determination the Court also analyzed the
criminal burden of beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court con-
cluded that this burden was too strict because "the uncertainties of
psychiatric diagnosis .. .may impose a burden the state cannot
meet and thereby erect an unreasonable barrier to needed medical
treatment." 46
B. Due Process Protections Included in North Carolina's Invol-
untary Civil Commitment Procedures
Initiation of involuntary civil commitment begins with any
third party who has knowledge of an individual's mental illness 47
and dangerousness,48 who executes an affidavit to a clerk or magis-
trate.49 If the clerk or magistrate finds reasonable grounds to be-
guilty by reason of unconsciousness cannot be committed to a mental hospital
unless it is established that the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to him-
self); In re Monroe, 49 N.C. App. 23, 270 S.E.2d 537 (1980) (an individual who
would fast and then eat whole loaves of bread, whole chickens, and five pounds of
sugar every two days did not satisfy the dangerousness criteria necessary for in-
voluntary commitment); In re Collins, 49 N.C. App. 243, 271 S.E.2d 72 (1980)
(court must consider whether there was any competent evidence to support a
finding of dangerousness and mental illness).
42. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
43. Id. at 418-19.
44. Id. at 426-27.
45. Id. at 425 (quoting Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir.
1971) (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
46. Id. at 432. See also French v: Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. 1351 (M.D.N.C.
1977), aff'd, 443 U.S. 901 (1979) (a standard of proof of beyond a reasonable
doubt is not required by due process clause and North Carolina's clear, cogent,
and convincing standard is constitutional).
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(21) (Supp. 1991).
48. Dangerousness includes "dangerous to himself," defined in N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 122C-3(11)(a) (Supp. 1991), and "dangerous to others," defined in N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(11)(b) (Supp. 1991).
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-261(a) (Supp. 1991). The different circumstances
surrounding initial involuntary commitment between insanity acquittees and civil
[Vol. 14:105
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lieve that the individual in question is both mentally ill and dan-
gerous then a custody order is executed5" and the individual is
picked up by law enforcement officers and brought to a 24-hour
mental health facility.51 During the first day of custody the indi-
vidual must be examined by a physician.52 If the physician finds
that the individual is mentally ill and either dangerous to himself
or to others, the individual is held at the facility until the
hearing.53
The hearing must be held in district court within 10 days.54
The court must find by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that
the individual is both mentally ill and dangerous to himself or to
others.55 If the court finds that the burden of proof is not satisfied,
the individual must be released.5" If the court finds that the bur-
den of proof is satisfied, then the court orders inpatient commit-
ment at a 24 hour facility for up to 90- days,57 at which time the
civil committee has the right to a rehearing.
At the rehearing the state must again prove by clear, cogent,
and convincing evidence that the civil committee remains mentally
ill and either dangerous to others or himself.58 If the burden is met,
the next mandatory rehearing is set for 180 days after the first re-
hearing.59 If the burden is not met at this rehearing, the individual
must be released. 60
Due to the Hayes case both the General Assembly and the
public were uneasy with these legal procedures because they did
not seem to provide adequate protection from defendants who had
been found beyond a reasonable doubt to have committed a dan-
gerous act.6 ' However, there was no data to support this percep-
tion. Data was not available to indicate that civil commitment pro-
committees begin here. The civil committee does not initiate commitment pro-
ceedings against him or herself, but the criminal defendant must raise insanity as
an affirmative defense pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-959(c) (1988).
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-261(b) (Supp. 1991).
51. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-261(e) (Supp. 1991).
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-266(a) (Supp. 1991).
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-266(a)(1) (Supp. 1991).
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-268(a) (Supp. 1991).
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-2680) (Supp. 1991).
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-271(b)(3) (Supp. 1991).
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-271(b)(2) (Supp. 1991).
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-276(d) (Supp. 1991).
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-276(e) (Supp. 1991).
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-271(b)(3) (Supp. 1991).
61. See supra note 17.
1991]
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cedures were being used by criminal defendants as a way to
circumvent criminal punishment.6 2 Nor had studies been done to
determine whether insanity acquittees once released from the hos-
pital were more dangerous than any other mental patients. 3 This
lack of data is especially important in the context of due process
analysis, because reductions in due process protections must meet
the constitutional standard of compelling state interest.
C. Due Process is Flexible
Senate Bill 43 has already been challenged in court on consti-
tutional grounds. In In re Coley, 4 the plaintiff contends that Sen-
ate Bill 43 violates the due process clause because it treats insanity
acquittees as a separate class of mental patient without a valid
public policy justification. 5
Due process formulation is a subjective process because "due
process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands."66 The United States Supreme Court
in Mathews v. Eldridge6 7 elucidated the factors to balance when
considering a due process question:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official ac-
tion; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the
62. In 1989, there was a total of 7 persons found "not quilty by reason of
insanity" (NGRI) admitted to state mental health facilities. The percentage of
current statewide hospital population found NGRI is .26%, (unpublished data
compiled by the North Carolina Attorney General's Office).
63. A 1989 study, H. McGinley, P. Pasewark, National Survey of the Fre-
quency and Success of the Insanity Plea and Alternative Pleas, 17 J. PSYCHIATRY
L. 205, 214-215 (1989), found that only 5 jurisdictions (North Carolina not being
one of them) were able to provide data on the frequency and success of the in-
sanity plea. The study showed that in the 5 jurisdictions which provided the data
the insanity plea is rarely used and rarely successful. Examples are Wyoming,
with one insanity plea out of 204 arrests with a 2% success rate, and Colorado
with one plea out of 4,968 arrests at a 44% success rate.
64. In re Coley, No. 91 SPC 639, (motion denied, N.C. Sup. Ct. Aug. 2, 1991)
(the petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Senate Bill 43, but no brief was
filed by petitioner, the case is still pending in Superior Court).
65. Id.
66. Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). See also Marshall v. United
States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974).
67. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
(Vol. 14:105
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fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substi-
tute procedural requirement would entail.6 8
Whether the new procedures of Senate Bill 43 are constitu-
tional requires an analysis of the private and governmental inter-
ests involved. 9 Each procedural change-automatic commitment,
burden of proof, and continuing commitment based on dangerous-
ness alone ("dangerousness test"), manifests a different mix of pri-
vate and governmental interests and will be analyzed separately in
Part III, sections A (automatic commitment), B (burden of proof),
and Part IV ("dangerousness test").
III. SENATE BILL 43's THREAT TO DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY
PROVIDING FOR INITIAL COMMITTMENT AND BURDEN OF PROOF
REQUIREMENTS DIFFERENT FROM CIVIL COMMITTEES
A. Jones v. United States: Is Automatic Commitment a Priva-
tion of Due Process?
1. State's Interest
Automatic commitment serves state interests in three impor-
tant ways. First, the state has a compelling interest in protecting
the public from an individual who has already been proven beyond
a reasonable doubt to have committed a crime. 0 In Jones v.
United States, the Supreme Court considered criminal acts to be
dangerous acts; "[t]he fact that a person has been found . . . to
have committed a criminal act certainly indicates dangerous-
68. Id. at 335.
69. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167-68 (1974) (in analysis of interests,
the term "just cause [for dismissal] as will promote the efficiency of the service"
as a standard of job security is intended to authorize dismissal for speech as well
as other conduct); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970) (due process re-
quirements are influenced by the grievous loss caused to a welfare recipient by
termination of aid, and outweighs governmental interest in summary adjudica-
tion); Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961) (held that commander of military installation denying access, without for-
mal hearing, of civil employee to site of her employment for security reasons was
unconstitutional). Important military interest of authority outweighs an individ-
ual interest in a formal hearing; Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)
(where State refusing to rehire assistant professor at state university, did not
make any charge against him that might seriously damage reputation, honor or
integrity, did not deprive him of a liberty interest protected by the fourteenth
amendment).
70. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 364 (1983).
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ness." 71 In a prior case the Court stated that the defendant's crimi-
nal act is "strong evidence that his continued liberty could imperil
'the preservation of public peace.' "72
Second, there is also a strong governmental "interest in avoid-
ing the need to conduct a de novo commitment hearing following
every insanity acquittal."73 The jury's determination of insanity at
trial makes it unnecessary to hold a subsequent pre-commitment
hearing on the same matter.74 The state values judicial efficiency.
and this efficiency interest is given strong weight in Jones.
Third, the state has an interest in preventing abuse of the in-
sanity plea. The legislature may "have considered it appropriate to
provide compulsory commitment for those who successfully invoke
an insanity defense in order to discourage false pleas of insanity."75
2. Private Interests
Mathews requires that the state's interests be balanced
against the individual's interests. 76 The individual has an interest
in being free from erroneous commitment. 77 In Jones, the Court
ruled that findings of fact at trial (concerning the state's obligation
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the criminal act, and the defendant's obligation to prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that he was insane), establish the de-
fendant's insanity as reliably as findings at a civil commitment
hearing." The Court added that "[Ilt is just and reasonable . . .
that the insanity, once established, should be presumed to con-
tinue and that the accused should automatically be confined for
treatment. ' 79 The original trial provides the defendant with ade-
quate due process protection and its conclusion supports subse-
71. Id.
72. Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 714 (1962) (quoting D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 21-236 (1962)).
73. Jones, 463 U.S. at 366.
74. Id.
75. Lynch, 369 U.S. at 715. See also Warren v. Harvey, 632 F.2d 925, 932 (2d
Cir. 1980) (abuse of insanity defense is valid consideration in designing proce-
dures for committing insanity acquittees), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 902 (1980).
76. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See supra notes 67-68 and ac-
companying text.
77. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
78. Jones, 463 U.S. at 364.
79. Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 13 (1955)).
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quent automatic commitment actions by the state."
B. Does the New Burden of Proof Meet Due Process
Requirements?
The United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the consti-
tutionality of shifting the burden of proof to the insanity acquittee
in release proceedings." However, the Court's reasoning in Jones8"
implies support for this shift by emphasizing the defendant's initi-
ative in establishing his own insanity.83 A logical extension of this
emphasis is to continue to keep the initiative with the insanity ac-
quittee in future release hearings.8
In addition, protection against erroneous commitment is writ-
ten into the provisions of Senate Bill 43. A hearing is required fifty
days after initial commitment.8 5 The insanity acquittee is repre-
sented by counsel if he desires,81 and is provided with the advan-
tages of an adversarial proceeding.8 At this hearing he can rebut
the presumption of insanity.8 If he does, he must be released.89 If
recommitted the patient is provided periodic hearings where he
can establish his sanity. Thus, the insanity acquittee is given sub-
80. Id. at 366.
81. "Petitioner has challenged neither the adequacy of the release standards
generally nor the disparity in treatment of insanity acquittees and other commit-
ted persons." Id. at 363 n.11.
82. See supra notes 72-74. The need to avoid a de novo review is no longer
consequential because the insanity acquittee is guaranteed periodic hearings by
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-276 (c),(d) (Supp. 1991). See also Benham v. Ledbetter,
785 F.2d 1480, 1490-91 (lth Cir. 1986).
83. Lower courts have cited Jones to validate statutes that create a proce-
dure for release for insanity acquittees different from procedures applicable to
civil committees. State v. Foucha, 563 So. 2d 1138, 1142 (La. 1990) (the "danger-
ousness test" for continuing commitment of the insanity acquittee does not vio-
late equal protection), cert. granted, 111 S.Ct. 1412 (1991); State v. Mahone, 127
Wis. 2d 364, 379 N.W.2d 878, 881 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (recommitment of insanity
aquittee because conditions necessary for release had not been fulfilled, and the
safety of such person or safety of others as a criteria for release is not cruel and
unusual punishment)..
84. Jones, 463 U.S. at 367. See Williams v. Wallis, 734 F.2d 1434, 1440 (11th
Cir. 1984).
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-268.1(a) (Supp. 1991).
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-268.1(d) (Supp. 1991).
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-268.1(g) (Supp. 1991).
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122 C-268.1(i) (Supp. 1991).
89. Id.
90. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-276.1(c) (Supp. 1991).
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stantial opportunity to gain his release."
IV. THE "DANGEROUSNESS TEST" OF SENATE BILL 43 AND DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS
At release hearings, insanity acquittees must first prove they
are no longer dangerous.2 If they succeed, they must then prove
they are not insane.93 This sequential, two-step process is different
from the conditions present at the patient's original trial.94 At that
time, the court regards dangerousness and insanity as inseparably
linked. 5 To then consider at re-commitment hearings the two con-
ditions as unrelated could allow unfair conclusions. For example, it
is possible for a patient to be recommitted for dangerousness with-
out any investigation of his sanity or insanity. Using the logic
demonstrated in Jones,9 dangerousness and insanity should be
considered in the same way at release hearings as they were in the
original trial: as related aspects of the same mental condition. 7
Preserving the original criteria throughout protects the patient by
establishing legitimate reasons for continued treatment and pro-
tects the public by providing a more thorough assessment of the
patient's progress.
V. RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF SENATE BILL 43
A. Ex Post Facto Law: Brief History
The prohibition against enactment of ex post facto laws9s "is
91. In fact, the insanity acquittee can be released unconditionally after only
50 days of commitment to a mental hospital, regardless of the severity of the
crime he committed. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983).
92. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1321 (Supp. 1991).
93. Id.
94. See supra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
95. "A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity establishes two facts: i) the
defendant committed an act that constitutes a criminal offense, and ii) he com-
mitted the act because of mental illness." Jones, 463 U.S. at 363.
96. The Jones ruling was based on consistency; i.e., as the defendant insisted
upon raising the insanity defense and proving his insanity by a preponderance of
the evidence, it is logical to require him to prove his sanity at the release hearing
by a preponderance of the evidence. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying
text. The "dangerousness test" lacks such a consistent structure. A consistent
structure would necessitate that criteria for confinement remain unchanged
throughout.
97. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 364 (1983).
98. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
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• . . designed to give individuals warning of new legislative acts
and the assurance that they can rely on them until explicitly
changed." 99 To fall within the scope of the ex post facto prohibi-
tion, three primary factors must be established: (1) the law "must
be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before
its enactment, (2) . . . it must disadvantage the offender affected
by it,"'' 0 and 3) it must apply to criminal matters.'
Insanity acquittees who raised the insanity defense before en-
actment of Senate Bill 43 expected their release to be governed by
procedures in place at the time of their trial. Retrospective appli-
cation of the stricter procedures of Senate Bill 43 frustrates these
expectations and is adverse to the acquittee's interests." ' There-
fore, the ex post facto status of Senate Bill 43 turns on whether it
is a civil statute, enacted for the protection of society (in which
case the ex post facto clause does not apply), or whether it is a
criminal statute designed to punish past conduct (in which case
the ex post facto clause does apply).
B. Involuntary Civil Commitment Processes Under the Auspices
of Civil Law
The first level of inquiry is to establish whether the North
Carolina General Assembly intends Senate Bill 43 to be civil law
rather than penal law.103 Apparently it does. N.C. GEN. STAT. §
15A-959 (1988) provides that "[i]f the court determines that the
defendant has a valid defense of insanity with regard to any crimi-
nal charge, it may dismiss that charge .... "o104 The insanity ac-
quittee is thereafter subject to the rules and procedures of civil law
as enacted by the North Carolina General Assembly.105
99. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981).
100. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29. See also Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430
(1987).
101. Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1925), characterized the nature of an ex
post facto law as any criminal statute:
[Wihich punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was in-
nocent when done; which makes more burdensome the punishment for a
crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime
any defense available according to law at the time when the act was com-
mitted, is prohibited as 'ex post facto.'
Id. at 169-70. See also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3- Dall.) 386, 390 (1798).
102. See supra note 25.
103. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980).
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-959 (1988).
105. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1321 (Supp. 1991). See infra note 106 and ac-
companying text.
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The accumulation of case law firmly supports the belief that
the insanity acquittee is not responsible for his behavior and is not
an appropriate target for punishment; i.e., the insanity acquittee is
not under the jurisdiction of the criminal system.106 In In re Rog-
ers,1 0 7 the respondent, an insanity acquittee, challenged the consti-
tutionality of a statute requiring a hearing before release, while
those civilly committed are permitted to be released at the discre-
tion of the director of the 24 hour facility.108 The respondent ar-
gued that the statute results in an increase in his punishment, thus
violating the ex post facto clause.'0 9 On the basis of the patient's
proven violent behavior the court ruled that the new procedure
does not constitute punishment for a crime but is relevant to the
wise discharge of insanity acquittees." °
C. Civil Statutes Which Have the Effect of Punishing Past Con-
duct and Violations of the Ex Post Facto Clause
After establishing the civil intent of Senate Bill 43, it is neces-
sary to proceed to a second level of inquiry:"' whether or not Sen-
ate Bill 43 is punitive "in purpose or effect as to negate that [civil]
intention.""' 2 "The ex post facto effect of a law cannot be evaded
by giving civil form to that which was essentially criminal.""' The
Court in Ex parte Garland,"4 found an ex post facto violation in a
constitutional provision that barred all persons from practicing law
who would not take an oath of past loyalty to the United States
Government." 5 The provision, which was a result of passions stem-
ming from the Civil War, was punitive in nature and therefore vio-
lated the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws." 6
To find that Senate Bill 43 is an ex post facto violation it must
106. State v. Silvers, 323 N.C. 646, 374 S.E.2d 858 (1989); State v. Marley,
321 N.C. 415, 364 S.E.2d 133 (1988).
107. 63 N.C. App. 705, 306 S.E.2d 510 (1988).
108. Id. at 706, 306 S.E.2d at 512.
109. Id. at 708, 306 S.E.2d at 512-13.
110. Id.
111. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980).
112. Id.
113. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 227, 285 (1867). See also Bur-
gess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381 (1878); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
114. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 337 (1866).
115. Id.
116. Id.
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be established that one of its provisions is punitive in nature.1 7
The automatic commitment"'8 and the shifted burden of proof' 9
provisions have a rational basis in legitimate state regulation.
However, the "dangerousness test" disregards the connection be-
tween insanity and dangerousness that has traditionally been the
basis of involuntary civil commitment proceedings. 20 This devia-
tion from involuntary civil commitment criteria, criteria which
guided the Court in Jones,2 ' strongly suggests that the "the dan-
gerousness test" is no longer civil in nature. This conclusion is sup-
ported by the connection between the uproar over the Hayes ver-
dict and immediate passage of Senate Bill 43.12 . Senate Bill 43 has
made it possible to institutionalize non-mentally ill people, and has
thus deviated too far from the fundamental precepts of involun-
tary civil commitment. 2 3 The "dangerousness test" should be con-
sidered punitive and therefore a violation of the constitutional pro-
hibition against ex post facto laws when applied retroactively.
CONCLUSION
The history of involuntary commitment traces the increasing
recognition of the importance of due process protections for the
mentally ill. Senate Bill 43 represents the latest step in this pro-
cess. However, it is different from previously enacted laws because
it places less burden on the state, rather than more. Justification
lies in the real danger that the criminally insane present to society.
Automatic commitment and a shift in the burden of proof to
the insanity acquittee are reasonable efforts by the North Carolina
General Assembly to protect the public from danger and to protect
the insanity defense from abuse. However, the "dangerousness
test" distorts the basic purpose (medical treatment of mental ill-
ness) of involuntary civil commitment.
117. See supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 70-80 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
123. In re Doty, 38 N.C. App. 233, 236, 247 S.E.2d 628, 630 (1978) "There are
two humanitarian purposes for involuntary commitment: [T]emporary withdrawal
from society of those who may be dangerous, and treatment." Id. "[T]he very
purpose of that deprivation is not solely to protect society but also has as a pur-
pose the protection, treatment, and aid of an individual who cannot or will not
protect himself." French v. Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. 1351, 1354 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
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This Comment contends that the "dangerousness test" is
therefore unconstitutional and that re-commitment to a mental
hospital should be based on the traditional criteria of both mental
illness and dangerousness. If this is done Senate Bill 43 will re-
present a positive step in our treatment of insanity acquittees. The
traditional criteria reinforce the logical connection between the
terms and conditions set forth in the original trial and the subse-
quent rights and responsibilities of the insanity acquittee.
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